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Perspectives on ‘The Lens of Risk’ interview series: Interviews with Tom 
Horlick-Jones, Paul Slovic and Andy Alaszewski 
 
Bob Heyman and Patrick Brown 
Abstract 
This article is the fourth and final one in a series of interviews with a selection of 
significant contributors to the social science of risk. It provides quasi-verbatim 
interviews with Tom Horlick-Jones, Paul Slovic and Andy Alaszewski. Tom Horlick-
Jones contributed to chapter 6 of the Royal Society (1992) Risk monograph, on risk 
management. He offers further insights into the debates which underlay its 
production to those given by Nick Pidgeon (Heyman and Brown, 2012) in the first 
article of this series. Paul Slovic provides a North American perspective on risk 
social science. Andy Alaszewski in the last of the nine interviews discusses his views 
about risk in relation to the evolution of his journal Health, Risk & Society. 
 
Short title: Interviews 
 
Introduction 
 
At the suggestion of the editor of Health. Risk & Society, Andy Alaszewski, Patrick 
Brown and Bob Heyman have undertaken a series of interviews with a sample of 
leading risk social scientists, including Andy Alaszewski, Judith Green, Tom Horlick-
Jones, Nick Pidgeon, Ortwin Renn, Paul Slovic, Peter Taylor-Gooby and Joost Van 
Loon. 
 
The interviews have been or will be presented across the series of special issues on 
Health Care Through the Lens of Risk published in 2012/2013. They cover views 
about: the meaning of the term ‘risk’; the significance of the Royal Society (2002) 
Risk report and equivalents from other countries; the history of risk social science; 
and the impact of risk-thinking on wider society and government policy. All of these 
topics are not necessarily included in every interview. Instead the most interesting 
material has been selected. The chosen interview content has been presented more 
or less verbatim. However, the interviewees were given the opportunity to edit the 
text as they wished, to accept small changes suggested by the editors, and to add 
references which, for this article, have been inserted directly into the text. Interviewer 
comments are shown in square brackets or endnotes. The order of presentation has 
been varied from the actual interview sequence which was variable and free-flowing. 
Interview extracts to date have been published for Nick Pigeon (Heyman and Brown, 
2012),  Joost Van Loon and Ortwin Renn (Brown and Heyman, 2012) and Judith 
Green and Peter Taylor-Gooby (Heyman and Brown, 2013).  
 
The present and final article in the series includes material from Tom Horlick-Jones, 
Paul Slovic and Andy Alaszewski. Tom Horlick-Jones is a Professor of Sociology at 
Cardiff University. Much of his research has been centrally concerned with re-
thinking the sociology of risk in terms of practical reasoning, language, knowledge 
and social interaction.  His work draws on his practical experience as a policy analyst 
and consultant.   
 Paul Slovic is a professor in the Department of Psychology, University of Oregon. He 
is a founder and president of Decision Research, a non-profit research organisation 
investigating human judgement, decision-making, and risk. Decision Research 
conducts both basic and applied research in a variety of areas including ageing, 
aviation, environmental risk, finance, health policy, medicine, and law. He studies 
judgement and decision processes, with an emphasis on decision-making under 
conditions of risk. His most recent research examines psychological factors 
contributing to apathy toward genocide.  
 
Andy Alaszewski has recently retired from the post of Professor of Health Studies 
and Director of the Centre for Health Studies at the University of Kent. He continues 
to be editor of the journal Health, Risk & Society which he founded, and which 
makes a seminal contribution to risk social science. He has published nearly 200 
papers and books, most recently Making Health Policy: A Critical Introduction 
(Alaszewski and Brown, 2012). 
 
The three interviewees all take a strongly interpretivist approach to risk phenomena, 
bringing the socially situated perceiver to the centre of analytical enquiry. Tom 
Horlick-Jones argues for the on-going relevance of now largely forgotten 
ethnomethodological accounts of social interactions. He sharply criticises the 
‘bubble’ of orthodoxy which he believes that some risk social scientists have fallen 
into, a mind-set which makes it de rigueur to cite Beck in every paper. As an author 
of the Royal Society Risk monograph, he offers, along with Pidgeon who was 
interviewed previously (Heyman and Brown, 2012), an insider account of its 
production. Tom’s commentary offers a reminder that the issue of objectivism divided 
social scientists, and was not merely a source of contention between them and the 
natural scientists who contributed to the  Risk monograph.  
 
The interview with Paul Slovic offers a critically reflective perspective on the 
relationship between risk-thinking and society from a founder of, and globally leading 
contributor to, the social psychology of risk. Like the other interviewees, Paul 
emphasises the role of the observer in risk judgements, particularly with respect to 
concealed values. He describes similar tensions in the USA between proponents of 
objectivist and interpretivist notions of risk to those which surfaced in the writing of 
the UK Royal Society Risk report. He mentions in the interview the finding from his 
research that public perceptions of positively and negatively valued consequences 
are negatively correlated. This finding suggests that research participants, overall, 
are reluctant to acknowledge that potential choices can carry mixes of positive and 
negative implications. Such ‘flights from ambivalence’ may help individuals and 
social groups to feel more comfortable about difficult decisions, but are likely to 
cause attitude polarization depending on whether ‘goods’ or ‘bads’ are emphasised. 
Ambivalence denial may also generate social and personal instability if downsides of 
accepted risks and upsides of rejected ones are ignored. 
 
We saved the last interview in the entire series for Andy Alaszewski, invited at the 
suggestion of Brown and Heyman, not his own. His founding and nurturing of Health, 
Risk & Society  as a vehicle for the study of uncertainty management in health and 
related contexts has been hugely significant to the field. It complements his own 
massive personal contribution over several decades to healthcare studies. In the 
interview, he articulates clearly an anthropological approach to risk in which the 
values concealed in official scientific accounts are themselves problematised. As he 
notes in the interview, Andy encourages authors of papers submitted to his journal to 
write in the first person, reversing the conventional wisdom. Of particular interest in 
the interview is his insider account of the UK government’s proactive response to the 
risks linked to Swine Flu, a response which involved spending nearly 500 million 
pounds on the anti-viral Tamiflu in 2009 despite concerns about its effectiveness. As 
a member of the committee tasked with shaping the UK response, he found himself 
unable to persuade senior figures of the merits of the only demonstrably effective, 
albeit politically inexpedient, response, namely quarantining infection hotspots in 
order to reduce the transmission rate. 
 
Interview with Tom Horlick Jones 
How do you see your own contribution to risk social science? 
 
Tom: At the forefront of my mind when I started to write about risk were political 
issues about planning. But also, I became increasingly interested in the nature of 
disasters. In 1990 I wrote a monograph ‘Acts of God’ with the subtitle ‘An 
Investigation Into Disasters’ which created a huge amount of interest. I wrote that 
whilst still working as a policy advisor [on disaster planning for the Greater London 
Council]. I spent some months trying to get my head round the nature of disasters 
and how best to plan for them. That included a whole range of very practical, 
technical problems, but I was getting increasingly interested in the sociology of 
disasters. I was always pretty eclectic in my interests - I was reading sociology books 
when I was a mathematics undergraduate. I had a fairly eclectic background in terms 
of disciplinary commitments.  
 
I’ve put Acts of God on my webpages (http://www.cf.ac.uk/socsi/resources/acts-of-
god.pdf), making it freely downloadable. It’s an interesting historical document which 
offered a very critical analysis of the then current state of disaster legislation, and 
also of local central government relations. But it was also a grounded theory 
analysis, using secondary data, rather like Barry Turner did for his PhD, on what 
sorts of factors predispose systems to fail. Publication produced considerable media 
interest, and a lot of newspaper articles. I remember the London Evening Standard 
devoted a whole page to my monograph. The Sunday Times wrote an article about 
me and the work I was doing which described me as ‘London’s Mr Disaster’.  It took 
a long time for me to live that down! 
 
The work I was involved in on the Notting Hill Carnival stands out as particularly 
interesting. The ESRC [Economic and Social Research Council] gave us some 
money to find some practical organisational risk management issues that were 
problematic in various ways; and to see if we could support decision-making 
processes using techniques developed in management science and operational 
research, called problem-structuring methods. These are methods that allow groups 
of people to agree a shared understanding about the nature of a problem. It uses 
various techniques such as small, soft models expressed as little pictures, to help 
participants to create transparency. I combined that approach with organisational 
ethnography in which I would go in to organisational settings and gain a very rich 
understanding of what was going on and why the particular risk management issue 
in question was problematic. We would use that understanding to design an 
intervention using problem-structuring methods. And we were quite successful in that 
we did a number of big projects including the strategic management of the Notting 
Hill Carnival. We did work with Railtrack on designing a technique for analysing the 
risks from railway junctions; and with the Post Office on trying to manage the risks 
associated with their fleet, particularly a very large number of road traffic accidents.  
 
Bob: Could you tell us a bit more about the issues associated with the Carnival? 
 
Tom: The ostensible issue that everybody was supposed to have been looking at 
was the safety of the public. And no reasonable person could disagree with the wish 
to make the Carnival a safer affair. But what we found when we dug away at it was 
that the different organisations involved all had different agendas and different 
understandings that they were projecting onto the risk object. For the Carnival 
organisers it was the continued success of the Carnival itself. And the main risk that 
they identified to the continuation of the Carnival was the hostility, as they saw it, of 
various public authorities such as the local government and the police. The police 
were anxious about public order issues, rather than safety per se, and that was 
driving what they were doing. We found that their means of policing the Carnival was 
shaped by a whole series of implicit understandings that they had developed 
amongst themselves, which we viewed as a risk trade-off rationale for not acting. 
There were a number of instances when the police didn’t act in what appeared to be 
clearly risky situations. And the accounts that they gave of why they didn’t act were 
very uniformly similar, even in very different situations, and with different police 
officers. And that was, ‘We didn’t act because we might have created a breakdown in 
public order’. The informal logics which shaped people’s behaviour deviated from the 
formal operating procedures that they were adhering to, and from formal 
commitments to the risk issue that they were supposed  be managing. 
 
How do you understand the term ‘risk’? What do you think of the Royal 
Society definition of risk? 
 
The Royal Society (1992, p.2) Risk monograph defined risk as follows: 
‘These definitions begin with risk as the probability that a particular adverse event 
occurs during a stated period of time, or results from a particular challenge. As a 
probability in the sense of statistical theory risk obeys all the formal laws of combined 
probabilities. 
 
Tom: My work has tended to invert the approach to thinking about risk from ‘How do 
we look at human behavioural aspects of managing these things in the world which 
threaten us’, towards redefining; or - to use an ethnomethodological expression - re-
specifying, risk issues in terms of practical reasoning and practical action. I think of 
risk issues as those for which human beings find it particularly difficult to give a good 
account of themselves for their involvement in those issues. So I would redefine risk 
issues in terms of social accountability. 
 
Bob: So it’s where social accountability breaks down? 
 
Tom:  Yes, it creates a fragility if you like, or a difficulty. All social situations involve 
people giving a reasonable account of themselves. What’s special about risk issues 
is, it makes that task particularly difficult. And that means that it opens up the 
possibility of a very rich micro-politics of how people cover their back in situations 
that are in some sense risky. The other thing is that - and this really got me on to 
thinking about risk in micro-sociological terms - is how there’s an ambiguity about the 
very nature of the risk object itself. And aside from the fact that terms like ‘adverse’ 
and ‘challenge’ can be contested, it strikes me that, even going down to the formal 
laws of combining probabilities comes unstuck. And if you go to logic, it’s the 
excluded middle, that’s the problem. The law of the excluded middle, as you may 
remember, in logic rests on the idea of a sort of continuity of essence of objects in 
the world. In other words, either A is true or A is not true, but you can’t have both 
being correct. Now it strikes me that risk issues are, to use another  
ethnomethodological expression, indexical. In other words, they come into being in 
the specific context in which they are considered. And there is an ambiguity about 
the nature of the risk object because different actors will, in different, specific 
situations, bring different understandings to what the risk issue is about.   
 
Can you tell us about your involvement in the writing of Chapter 6 [‘Risk 
Management’] of the Royal Society (1992) Risk monograph? 
 
Tom: Barry Turner led a team of authors of whom I was one. But he became unwell 
after writing the first draft. He dropped out of the project for a while. Chris Hood took 
over the lead role for chapter 6. (I think it was Chris who coined the expression, ‘Four 
chapters good, two chapters bad’, paraphrasing Orwell’s Animal Farm in response to 
Royal Society unease about the social science chapters.) 
  
Bob: How far did the final form of chapter 6 correspond to Barry Turner’s draft? 
 
Tom: The final version of chapter 6 was very much the work of Chris Hood, 
reflecting his interest in cybernetic models of organisations. I was critical of that 
analysis, feeling that it side-stepped some fundamental issues about the extent to 
which the risk object is, at least in part, socially constituted (Horlick-Jones, 1998, p. 
80). As such, it didn’t really threaten a more technocratic view of risk issues.  
 
But the draft chapter I considered certainly didn’t have a sociological feel to it. 
Looking back now, it’s surprising how much relevant work from social research 
simply didn’t get a mention. Barry is perhaps best known for his book Man-Made 
Disasters (Turner and Pidgeon, 1978), which examined the social and organisational 
roots of failures. Although material on systems failures did find its way into chapter 6, 
the chapter omitted a wide range of important contemporary risk-related work: for 
example, in the sociology of health and illness and in socio-legal studies. Erving 
Goffman and Tony Giddens didn’t get a mention, and neither did Steve Rayner’s 
work on hospital radiation hazards. One could go on. At the time, somebody who 
moved in Royal Society circles, and was in a senior position, I remember this person 
saying to me that even though I had done research in theoretical physics, they 
thought I sounded like a sociologist. But when they spoke with Chris Hood, they 
thought he sounded like a physicist!   
 
How do you see risk social science? 
 
Tom: I suppose the first thing to say is that it’s not science, at least not the sort of 
work that I do, and in which I’m interested. Of course that doesn’t mean that it cannot 
be rigorous, skilled and systematic. On the contrary, at its best I think it’s as hard and 
complicated as anything I encountered in theoretical physics. I can understand why 
some colleagues like to portray themselves as scientists, but there’s a problem here. 
One can be scientific about measuring the trajectory of a beam of electrons, but 
human being and electrons are different sorts of objects. In particular, electrons don’t 
read newspapers or have conversations.  
 
I feel that there is a sort of academic establishment which looks at risk in certain 
fashionable ways. When I was reading through your questions, it occurred to me 
that, if you want me to distinguish my approach, it’s really not wishing to be 
fashionable. And you know, the old joke, I think it might go back to Freud actually, 
and it was picked up by Groucho Marx and Woody Allen, who said that they wouldn’t 
want to belong to any club that would have them as a member.  
 
One of the difficulties we have with risk scholarship at the moment is that there’s an 
emerging bubble, and I see many colleagues living in a bubble. They’re talking about 
risk issues in the same sort of way. And that seems to me to have coincided with, 
over the last ten years, a diminution in the amount of data that one sees in published 
papers. It’s only latterly that I’ve increasingly thought about the risk bubble. I am 
aware that certain theorists have attempted to understand such social bubbles more 
generally in terms of systems; particularly Nicholas Luhmann, and the idea that 
social sub-systems generate codes which then which then shape their evolution. 
They develop a sort of introspection in which the logic of their being tends to be 
inward-looking; attempting to continue the life of the system in its present form even 
though it needs to interact with its environment. 
  
In this respect, it’s interesting to look at the trajectory of Health, Risk & Society. I 
remember going to the opening launch meeting in London and being very excited 
about the prospect of a journal that would look eclectically at a range of risk 
phenomena. And I have contributed quite a lot of papers over the years to the journal 
(e.g. Horlick-Jones et al, 2001; Horlick-Jones, 2005; Horlick-Jones and Prades, 
2009). But even though Health, Risk & Society continues to be a journal that anyone 
interested in risk should be reading, an increasing number of papers appearing in the 
journal tend to be in this bubble. There’s a, ‘One has to cite Beck’ attitude. And one 
has to articulate one’s position in certain ways. A sort of orthodoxy has grown which 
isn’t entirely productive in terms of understanding the nature of risk phenomena. I 
should add that I feel this tendency is fairly widespread within social research and 
publication. I guess it’s a sign of the times, and perhaps a genealogical history of 
these events will be written one day. But that’s not to say that these tendencies 
shouldn’t be resisted.  
 
Interview with Paul Slovic 
 
How do you see your own contribution to risk social science? 
 
Paul: Everything I have done has been done with other people. I have had probably 
200 collaborators [laughter]. 
 
Bob: This is your opportunity to boast! 
 
Paul: Well, with two colleagues, we have shown that, just as you can attempt to 
assess risk from the quantitative technical side of things, you can also assess it on a 
social psychological or perceptual basis, producing orderly results that have 
implications for policy. And we found that risk perceptions were related to people’s 
values. And then we found that not only was it values that were linked to 
perceptions, but also feelings and emotions. More recently, we have linked in 
ideologies and worldviews. We have documented the complexity of this concept we 
call ‘risk’. Our contribution has been to broaden the appreciation of risk as a complex 
technical, scientific concept, which it certainly is, but also its social, cultural and 
communicative aspects. We have to appreciate all of those facets in order to 
communicate about, and manage, risks properly. 
 
Bob: Do you think that, in the USA, policy-makers have taken that on board? 
 
Paul: Not so much. I wish I could say that things have changed a lot because of our 
work, but, I don’t think so. For example, since 1982 we have been trying to find a 
place to store nuclear waste with 100 nuclear reactors operating, and 30 years later, 
we still don’t have a place. 
 
Bob: It’s the same in the UK. 
 
Paul: The people who are in charge of siting tend to be brilliant engineers who don’t 
appreciate the importance of process, or understand that risk is not simply a matter 
of probability. If we were operating more in tune with the complexity of the issues, we 
would have different processes and be further along than we are now. That’s just 
one example. I think that there is now more appreciation of the need to bring the 
public into the discussion of these issues. Occasionally that happens, but we still 
have a long way to go. 
 
How do you understand the term ‘risk’? 
 
Paul: It’s a term that we are very comfortable about using without thinking carefully 
about its meaning in any particular context. I can see numerous ways to conceive of 
risk: as hazard; as probability; or when we are really referring to a consequence. I 
am most comfortable with defining risk as a blend of the probability and severity of 
some hazardous outcome. Because the evaluation of an outcome is fairly subjective, 
it is a subjective concept. It’s best to define risk for any particular use that one wants 
to make of it. It’s not that one has to define it in any one way or another. But if you 
are going to use the term in a serious way, for example in setting up health policy, 
then it should be carefully defined so that everyone knows what you are referring to 
in that context. 
 
Bob: Are you suggesting that sometimes risk is not defined carefully enough? 
 
Paul: It’s a word that rolls off our tongue, and people judge by the context in a 
general or vague way what’s being referred to. We are very good at using part of the 
context of a conversation or a discussion to get a sense of how this word is being 
used. As things get serious, or there is a controversy, which there often is, then one 
has to look more precisely at the way the word is defined. The definition is important 
because the notion of risk is taken very seriously. It is treated as the key element of 
rationality in any kind of analysis of an action plan. Whoever gets to define the 
concept carries a lot of weight. That’s why I have said that the defining of risk is an 
exercise of power because it can dominate the decision that is made. 
 
Bob: Does a particular example come to mind of the hidden politics of defining risk? 
 
Paul: I became sensitised to this in work on nuclear power in the 80s and 90s. The 
technical community argued that nuclear power was extremely safe, and a strong, 
energetic opposition held that it was too risky. So what was going on there? I think 
that the industry were looking at the probability of an accident being miniscule. 
According to the technical community, because the probability was so small, the 
expected loss was low and acceptable. Opponents probably disagreed about that 
[very low probability of a nuclear plant disaster], but they were also giving great 
weight to the dread nature of the consequences of a nuclear accident. The technical 
community did not consider the risk of non-adherence to safety protocols, or the 
involuntary nature of the risks which the public might be exposed to. What you bring 
into the equation for defining risk in a particular way has a great impact on how risky 
the technology is judged to be. There was a strong tendency to say that the public’s 
opposition to these chemical and nuclear technologies was based on a combination 
of ignorance and irrationality. I took exception to that. 
 
Bob: It’s difficult with probability because single events, however catastrophic, don’t 
tell you the underlying likelihood. 
 Paul: Well it’s a challenge to try and estimate the probability of rare events where 
you don’t fully understand the generational process. With some systems like 
transportation, we can estimate probabilities quite precisely because we have huge 
amounts of data and can empirically identify environmental and driver risk factors.  
 
Bob: Similarly, in the health field, even where knowledge is poor you can at least 
count outcomes.  
 
Paul: Yes, but even in the health area where we have a lot of data, when you   
introduce some new intervention, you again run into the problem of whether you 
have enough data or experience. For example, when you introduce a new drug onto 
the market, the screening is usually not lengthy or extensive enough to detect the 
likelihood of relatively infrequent problems. 
 
What do you think of the Royal Society definition of risk? 
 
The Royal Society (1992, p.2) Risk monograph defined risk as follows: 
‘These definitions begin with risk as the probability that a particular adverse event 
occurs during a stated period of time, or results from a particular challenge. As a 
probability in the sense of statistical theory risk obeys all the formal laws of combined 
probabilities.’ 
 
Paul: If you want to define risk as probability that’s fine, if you can get away with it in 
your local constituency, and you can say, ‘Okay this is the way we are defining risk’. 
But in that case, I would say, ‘Why bring risk in?’. If you define risk as probability, call 
it probability. We have an immense body of theory, knowledge and experience 
relating to probability. Once you call it ‘risk’, you are maybe obscuring that 
knowledge because you are bringing other things in, interpreting it in different ways. I 
think it’s a mistake. Why suddenly bring in the muddied and complex concept of risk 
when you wish to analyse probability? 
 
Bob: As you said in one of your e-mails to me, one of the key issues is that the 
Royal Society definition takes adversity for granted as an intrinsic property of events. 
So conflating probability and risk smuggles in value judgements. 
 
Paul: In my research, I found that the ‘risk’ of getting wrong change in the grocery 
store was rated highest among a set of consequences. Lennart Sjoberg (Sjöberg, 
Moen, and Rundmo, 2004) found much the same result. All kinds of inferences could 
be drawn from this finding - about how  strange people are in their judgements of 
risk.  I concluded that this occurred because, when asked about the risk of a 
consequence, people think of risk  as a probability and getting the wrong change in a 
store has a higher probability than more serious, and, in my opinion, more risky 
consequences such as getting AIDS from an infected needle. You can see that I 
prefer a definition of risk that considers both probability and severity of 
consequences. 
 
 
Is there a US equivalent of the Royal Society Risk monograph, where an 
august body has tried to tie down risk? 
 Paul: I don’t think there is. There are some monographs on risk assessment. For 
example, the National Academy of Sciences (1983) did a monograph on risk 
assessment in the Federal Government which was very influential. They did a lot 
with toxicology and chemical risks. It wasn’t very sensitive to the social science 
elements, but was influential in guiding policy. The National Academy  (Stein and 
Fineberg, 1996) did a study which I was part of called ‘Understanding Risk: Informing 
Decisions in a Democratic Society’ which brought in all of those social elements that 
I and others had been working on during the   previous decade. It showed that risk 
assessment is a complex process that involves value judgements, negotiations and 
power issues. I don’t think that that document put forth a very precise definition of 
risk, but it recognised that how you evaluate a risk is very critical. And we argued for 
a more inclusive process that included a lot of stakeholders at the table in risk 
evaluation.  
 
Do you think risk has become a key feature of late modern society? 
 
Paul: That’s a good question. Because risk is heavily influenced by culture and 
politics, the answer will depend on where you live . I can answer best for the US, but 
as you know America is not homogeneous. 
 
In the US, risk is a big issue. Concern about risks has grown steadily. Google made 
available digitalised versions of millions of books, and you can search there for the 
frequency of different words like risk and safety. You can see that, in the past, 
‘safety’ and ‘risk’ were used about equally often. As the decades roll on, you see 
exponentially increasing usage frequency for the term ‘risk’, whereas ‘safety’ sort of 
pootles along without much changei. Risk is now everywhere in contemporary 
society, triggered by events. In the last decade, terrorism has come on the scene, 
and is a risk which has dominated and influenced our society in many ways, mostly 
adversely. It tends to take away people’s liberties and privacy in the name of trying to 
reduce a low probability threat even lower. 
 
Bob: Do you have any thoughts about why, as you said, safety has bumped along  
while risk-thinking has shot up? 
 
Paul: I’m not sure I know the answer. We see that natural disasters are increasing 
in frequency and severity, so that’s one element. Climate change involves more 
extreme weather events which can be immensely destructive, and the population 
has increased in size and is located in vulnerable areas. If you look  over the last 20, 
30, 40 years, you see again an exponentially increasing curve of losses from natural 
disasters, coupled with the increased ability of the media to make us aware of such 
events. There is now a heightened sensitivity to risks from nature, and we have risks 
from other types of physical systems, and of political and non-political violence. A 
book by Steven Pinker (Pinker, 2011) argues that violence in the world has declined 
steadily over recent centuries. But this is still a very brutal world. Even though life 
expectancy in many places is now better than it ever was, risk is still a major concern 
in our minds (Slovic, 2000). Modern communication media have contributed to that 
by bringing all these events right into our living rooms. 
 
Bob: The question coming out of that is to the extent to which the world has 
become ‘riskier’ as against the extent to which we are less willing to tolerate hazards 
which in the past would have just been accepted? 
 
Paul: Psychologically, there is a strong tendency to say the world is riskier. In the 
70, 80s and 90s, when we did a lot of our survey research, we would always ask 
respondents whether they thought that risk was greater than it was 20 years ago. 
They always thought that today’s risks were worse than the risks of the past, but I 
don’t agree with that. It’s probably different from what it was in the past, but the past 
was very risky as well. Disease was rampant, with less effective treatments   
available to deal with it, and violence was just horrific. There is a reason that all 
these cities in Europe had walls because people were attacking their neighbours 
constantly. 
 
Today there are different types of risk, and it’s not just that the type of risk has 
changed. The number of people who may be affected by an event is greater, but our 
population is greater. The chance of  getting millions of people killed in a natural 
disaster is much greater today than in the past.  The interconnectedness of people in 
different societies today and dependence on systems that we don’t understand 
creates vulnerability which is a key term. More and more, one hears calls for 
vulnerability assessment as well as risk assessment. 
 
A view that has evolved over the last 10 or 15 years is that of ‘risk as a feeling’ 
(Slovic, 2010). And that’s an issue that I slowly became interested in and developed 
out of the work in nuclear arena. We found that across hazardous activities, costs 
and benefits are negatively correlated in people’s minds, whereas in the world they 
can’t possibly be.  We eventually  realised that research participants were judging 
the risks and benefits of some activity on the basis of how they felt about it. Whether 
they liked  or didn’t like the activity came first, and risk and benefit judgments were 
derived from those feelings. For a risk analyst who is calculating with data this is not 
likely to be the caseii. But for a person who is just going on gut feeling, their intuitions 
drive their  judgements about risks and benefits. Over time, we came to realise that 
this is a guiding factor in the way most people relate to risk, and argued that it 
derives from way back in evolution.  We didn’t use toxicology to assess whether the 
water in a stream was safe to drink. We used our vision (‘How clean does it look?’), 
our sense of smell and taste, our past  experience, for example whether it made us 
sick or not. That was the way we judged risk, and we still do so today most of the 
time. We rarely do a calculation. When we appreciate the importance of feelings and 
emotions, then we can understand what’s going on with the difference between 
responses to terrorism and to climate change. The image in our minds of a terrorist 
act is so horrific, dreadful and obnoxious that it conveys very strong feelings which 
dominate the probability of the event. When we think about certain types of terrorist 
activities we get this very strong visceral feeling and disregard the  probability of 
such acts. That’s been shown in studies. It’s called Probability Neglect (Sunstein, 
2003). 
 
With climate change, it’s different. The types of consequences tend to be vague; we 
see them as distant in time and geographic proximity; and they don’t have that sense 
of dread attached to them. It’s harder to get people energised about it. I am quite 
pessimistic about this, and think that the record of actions today to mitigate climate 
change is very dismal. Ultimately, I fear that we are not going to act until it’s very late 
in the day, and then of course we will suffer the consequences. 
 
There is also a cultural element. We attend to information about risk, and interpret 
that information in ways that support the kind of worldview that we want to endorse. 
That sort of analysis has its origins in the work of Mary Douglas (Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1982). We know that reactions to risk are related to the kind of worldview, 
hierarchical, individualistic, or egalitarian that a person holds (Kahan and Braman, 
2006).This poses a challenge as information that is meant to educate is interpreted 
in a way that reinforces one’s worldview and leads to further polarisation of attitudes 
and behaviour. 
 
Interview with Andy Alaszewski 
 
How do you see your own contribution to risk social science? 
 
Andy: My first degree was in social anthropology. And, as (1988) convincingly 
argued, producing ethnography has more in common with creating fiction than with 
writing scientific papers. For example, both ethnography and fiction can and do make 
use of the first person narrator while science papers use the passive voice to 
conceal the active agency of the researcher. I still favour the interpretive aspect of 
social science. I ask authors who want to publish in Health, Risk & Society to write in 
the active voice. I think my interest in risk was stimulated by reading fiction. For 
instance, Peter Carey’s novel Oscar and Lucinda originally published in the 1980s 
(Carey, 1998) offers a perfect illustration of the unpredictability of the future and that 
‘the answer to the question, “What might happen” must be “Absolutely anything!”, 
including events which scientists consider impossible’ (Heyman, Alaszewski and 
Brown, 2013 p. 3). Going back to the second half of the nineteenth century, George 
Eliot’s novels explored both the limitations of modern calculative rationality, and how 
it was replacing other forms such as those grounded in religion or hope. She 
provided important insights into the ways that many modern institutions such as the 
medical profession developed out of religious institutions. From this perspective, 
priests use sin and modern professions employ risk to control behaviour and punish 
deviants.  
 
My interest in interpretive social science has influenced my approach to research. 
For example, in our studies of risk and nursing and of stroke survivors and the ways 
they manage risk (Alaszewski et al. 2000 and Alaszewski et al., 2006) we used 
diaries, and I have written a textbook on diary research (Alaszewski 2006). Diaries 
can be used both as a literary device and as a means of accessing individuals’ 
experiences. Some texts do both. For instance, Daniel Defoe’s Journal of a Plague 
Year (Defoe 1722) can be read as a work of fiction and as an ethnography. 
  
Bob: How has your research influenced your approach to risk? 
 
Andy: I was fortunate in that my first project was an ethnographic study of a learning 
disability hospital (Alaszewski 1986). The background reading involved a number of 
Foucault’s early texts, while the research itself brought me into contact with a group 
of vulnerable adults whose social status at the time was defined in terms of risk. 
They were a group of adults who, at that time, were judged unable to protect 
themselves, and were seen as not able to undertake simple everyday activities like 
crossing the road. The protective cocoon grounded in basic trust (Giddens, 1991, p. 
244) that exists around most people did not necessarily apply to them.  
 
With the development of anti-institutional ideologies such as the normalisation 
philosophy, the challenge became to recognise human rights for people with learning 
disabilities, including the right to take risks. So when we worked with Barnado’s we 
were trying to address the issue of how do we allow people with learning disabilities 
to spontaneously take risks but at the same time keep them safe (Alaszewski and 
Ong 1990). More recently, I have explored the lived experiences of risk through work 
which my wife Helen and I have done with stroke survivors. Helen, who is a brilliant 
interviewer, has followed a group of stroke survivors for two years. As Helen’s 
interviews and stroke survivors’ diaries show, stroke is often experienced as a 
traumatic event in which a sudden loss of control punctures the cocoon of basic 
trust, exposing individuals to an uncertain and potentially unmanageable future, in 
which their survival is in question. All faced uncertainty, and tried to regain control 
over their bodies and lives, but in diverse ways. Some adopted a structured rational 
approach, drawing on expert assessment and strategies for managing risk. Others 
effectively reject expert advice and used their personal biography to reassert their 
confidence in their bodies (Alaszewski, Alaszewski and Potter, 2006).  
 
Bob:  How does editing the journal fit with your approach to risk research? 
 
Andy: I see Health, Risk & Society as offering an invaluable opportunity to develop 
insights into risk. The emphasis on health can be a bit restricting, but I am happy to 
take an inclusive approach. When Patrick Brown starts editing special issues on risk 
and social theory we will take an even broader approach. HRS provides an 
opportunity for health researchers to publish longer articles drawing on qualitative 
data. Articles grounded in quantitative data are also important. For example, the 
article by Finucane, Slovic and colleagues (2000) about the White Male Effect on risk 
perception remains the most cited in HRS. However, I think that qualitative papers, 
especially those grounded in ethnographic data, provide particular insights into the 
ways in which ‘risk’ is managed and used. I particularly enjoyed editing the two 
linked special issues on risk and everyday life (Alaszewski and Coxon 2008 and 
2009).  
 
I was looking through the HRS website recently. I think you [Bob Heyman] are the 
most published author in HRS, and you started with an important editorial in the first 
Volume in which you explored the relationship between risk analysis and health 
practice (Heyman 1999). I am grateful for your continued support and contribution to 
HRS. Your work in making these four special issues such a success has been 
amazing.  
 
How do you understand the term ‘risk’? What do you think of the Royal 
Society definition of risk? 
 
The Royal Society (1992, p.2) Risk monograph defined risk as follows: 
‘These definitions begin with risk as the probability that a particular adverse event 
occurs during a stated period of time, or results from a particular challenge. As a 
probability in the sense of statistical theory risk obeys all the formal laws of combined 
probabilities.’  
 
Andy: In our ESRC funded study of risk and health (Alaszewski, Harrison and 
Manthorpe 1998) we defined risk as the probability of undesired consequences. 
 
Bob: That matches the Royal Society definition, with risk rendered as the probability 
of a defined adverse event category?  
 
Andy: Yes, but that’s not surprising as the Royal Society Report was ‘set reading’ for 
all applicants to the ESRC Risk Programme. However, the report was coming from a 
natural science base. It did not specify who was defining adversity, whereas our 
definition focused on individuals with their desires and experience of undesirable 
consequences. 
 
How do you see the history of risk social science? 
 
Bob: Do you think risk studies have a future? 
 
Andy: Yes, it’s a big area and there are links to other interesting issues such as 
trust, suffering and hope. However, I think traditional rational science-based 
approach may be more problematic. 
  
Bob: Why? 
 
Andy: It’s grounded in a fallacy, that science and scientist are rational and the public 
is irrational –  
 
Bob: and need to be educated? 
 
Andy: Yes. However there are irrational elements in science, and scientific work 
takes place in a social context. The rationality of science is therefore limited, and 
there are frequently tensions within the scientific community. The public are often 
perfectly rational. It just happens that their rationality and their interests are different 
to those of ‘risk experts’. Some social scientists such as Adam Burgess are 
interested in fighting bad science and urban myths such as the story that the use of a 
mobile phone on the forecourt of a petrol has caused an explosion and could do so 
again. It’s good if some academics want to do that, but for me it is important to 
understand everyday perspectives of both experts and other people. 
My background was in anthropology, and ethnographers traditionally explored the 
issue of how people in pre-modern societies dealt with situations and events that we 
now have quite a lot of scientific knowledge about. Given the development of 
Western medicine, there is a good understanding of how parasites, infections, 
viruses, bacteria affect the body, and that understanding provides a basis for 
predictions. The question is how to deal with the uncertainties which remain. It’s a 
central problem and underlies magic, divination, the whole phalanx of belief systems 
that are filling the gap that medicine leaves in our society. Of course, in our society, 
medicine does reduce uncertainty to some extent. But those other approaches still 
float around, and tend to be less collective and more individualistic. The case of 
Steve Job’s getting diagnosed with cancer and spending nine months doing holistic 
medicine before he had his operation offers an interesting example of that sort of 
floating around. 
 
Do you think risk has become a key feature of late modern society? 
 
Andy: Yes. Clearly you need to consider risk alongside uncertainty which is an 
intrinsic part of the human condition. When I was studying social anthropology I 
learnt that in both modern and pre-modern society, individuals in their everyday lives 
have to make important decisions in conditions of uncertainty. Evans-Pritchard’s  
(1976) account of the Azande originally published in the 1930s showed how they 
used religious rituals and practices such as divination to manage these uncertainties. 
A risk framework offers one particular way of managing uncertainty which is 
advocated by experts such as doctors and engineers as more ‘modern’ and 
intrinsically better than previous approaches. It has the symbols of modernity. Its 
advocates claim it is ‘rational’, scientific and evidence-based. It uses complex 
mathematics and can be expressed in hard numbers. By focusing on the objective 
and measureable, risk-thinking can also paper over some of the cracks of modernity, 
for example the difficulty we have with values.  
 
It is important to remember that, as Zinn (2008) so convincingly argues, risk co-
exists with other ways of dealing with uncertain futures such as trust and hope. Even 
in areas where risk appears to be the accepted means of managing uncertainty, it is 
important be sensitive to the possibility that individuals use other strategies, the 
operation of which may be hidden by the dominant risk discourse. For example, in a 
recent Health, Risk & Society article on how people use and understand probability, 
Burton-Jeangros and her colleagues (2013) explored the ways in which pregnant 
women responded to the results of screening for the probability of foetal 
chromosomal anomalies. Some mothers accepted the expert risk discourse, 
grounding their decisions in the numerical results of their screening. However, others 
rejected the numbers, grounding their decision in their understanding of their own 
body, or in the magic of modern medicine.  
 
Bob: So you see one of the functions of risk as providing a modern way of dealing 
with uncertainty? 
 
Andy: Yes. It makes us believe we are modern and superior, that we don’t base our 
decisions on the irrationality of religion or superstition and old wives’ tales, we don’t 
deal with sin, we don’t deal with morality, we are not prejudiced, we can provide 
technical solution to complex problems. Risk conceals the role of judgements and 
values. 
 
Bob: In some of your work you say that if you talk to ordinary people, they don’t 
actually think about risk all that much? 
 
Andy: Yes. I think that Giddens (1991) deals with this issue rather well when he 
argues that we live in a cocoon of trust which brackets out risk. As some of the 
articles in HRS on eating make clear, in everyday life and activities we often don’t 
think of the potentially dire consequences of many of our actions. Individual 
misfortune such as a stroke or a collective disasters particularly those in which 
horrific images are rerun in the media such as 9/11 (Pollard, 2011) can puncture this 
cocoon of trust and make us aware of the uncertainty and fragility of our existence, 
impelling us to engage in expensive, futile even counterproductive attempts to 
manage the future such as the Bush/Blair ‘War on Terror’. However, such events are 
rare and exceptional, and our everyday life is mostly not one of uncertainty, danger 
and anxiety.  
 
One of the interesting findings of the SCARR research network managed by Peter 
Taylor-Gooby was the contrast between those aspects of life which individuals are 
willing to see in terms of risk, and those which they are not. When discussing the 
formation of intimate relations, individuals did not see risk as an appropriate or 
pleasant way of framing uncertainty. Individuals entering an intimate relationship 
accepted that things could go wrong, but they did not really want to consider failure 
as they wanted and expected to experience an intimate and loving relationship. In 
contrast, individuals who lived close to a nuclear power station had already reflected 
on the possibility that it might blow up, and were willing to talk about it.  
 
Bob: So you are saying that uncertainty is present, but people push it to one side? 
 
Andy: Uncertainty and danger are ever-present, but you can choose whether to 
highlight them, and experts seem only too keen to highlight them for you. I don’t 
believe that you can look at, for example, the organisation of work without 
considering risk, how claims and counterclaims over risk expertise are now central to 
the nature of professionalisation. 
 
Bob: Judith Green said in her interview for this series that if you are a front-line 
professional, you get these wretched forms, and you have to tick the boxes, but 
there are real questions about how they relate to actual risk management practice. 
 
Andy: Yes I did a study when I was at Hull with my wife Helen (Alaszewski, 
Alaszewski, Ayer and Manthorpe 2000) on nursing and risk, and it was very clear 
that in different areas of nursing risk had varying prominence. If you were supporting 
people with mental illness, risk loomed large because a nurse could at any moment 
have one of his or her clients axing somebody to death, and the decision-tree would 
track back to that nurse. Nurses working with older people or people with learning 
disabilities were not in the same risk spotlight. However, the learning disability field 
may be changing since we did our research as there have been a few high profile 
incidents recently in which vulnerable clients have been very badly abused and killed 
by their so-called friends. At the time when we did our studies, there was evidence of 
support for positive risk-taking but attitudes change. 
 
Do you think risk has become a key element of government policy? 
 
Andy: In our recent book on health policy making (Alaszewski and Brown, 2012) we 
explored the ways in which policy makers invoked rationality to justify their policies. 
Risk has become a key source of legitimacy for policy-makers. Given the way in 
which risk embodies the key features of modernity, it is hardly surprising to find it 
featuring prominently in contemporary policy-making. In the UK, the New Labour 
Government (1997-2010) drew heavily on risk-thinking which it used to justify the 
restructuring of the National Health Service (NHS). When they gained power in 1997, 
New Labour inherited a reformed NHS in which rationing and claimed economic 
rationality were key elements of the internal health care market. The Government 
needed to soften this hard cost-cutting rhetoric, and risk provided the perfect tool. It 
enabled ministers to retain the internal market, but use clinical governance to shift 
the emphasis from rationing and cost-cutting to managing risk and enhancing patient 
safety. New Labour were very open to current academic thinking, particularly 
Anthony Giddens. For example, the second Lecture of Giddens influential Reith 
Lecture series was on risk (1999). This approach gave health policy a neoliberal 
slant, with individuals expected to take responsibility for their own health and to 
manage their own risks, with the state empowering individuals through initiatives 
such as the Expert Patient and Public Health programmes. A risk framework 
provides the illusion of control, allowing those who make polices and decisions to 
assert they are acting for the collective good. 
 
Bob: Do you think that the risk-based approach is not so prominent in current 
policy?  
 
Andy: I do. It is instructive to look at the Public Health policy of the present 
[Conservative-led] Coalition Government. Unlike her predecessors as Chief Medical 
Officer, Sally Davies doesn’t come from Public Health. She’s a physician with a 
scientific research background who has downplayed a lot of the risk rhetoric. Her 
approach has been highly laid-back, to the point of scrapping advertising campaigns 
for flu-jabs.  
 
Bob: Yes. There’s an interesting comparison to the response to Swine Flu which is 
in our book (Heyman, Shaw, Alaszewski and Titterton, 2010). 
 
Andy: I was on the [New Labour] Government Pandemic Flu Committee, and got 
insight into the operation of a coalition between Public Health experts in the 
Department of Health and the drug companies. The Public Health experts were 
comfortable with responses that built around drugs. They were very happy with 
Tamiflu, an antiviral drug designed to reduce the symptoms of flu, and were willing to 
fund the drug companies to produce vaccines against specific flu viruses. They were 
not comfortable with other approaches. I raised the issue of social distancing. We 
have evidence from the 1918/9 flu pandemic, when cities in the United States 
adopted different social distancing measures. Those cities that were shut down, and 
in which people were prevented from moving around, were the ones with the lowest 
infection and mortality rates. If you have rerun of 1918/19 you need to start thinking 
about social distancing, shutting schools, public transport and sporting events. But 
the Public Health people seemed scared of being accused of being part of the nanny 
state and infringing individuals’ civil liberties. All they wanted to talk about were drugs 
and individual hygiene, blowing your nose and washing your hands. 
  
Bob: Anything where it’s the individual taking responsibility.  
 
Andy: The other point that I was trying very clearly to make was that actually you 
need to be able to inform people of the level of threat. Are we dealing with a 1918 
epidemic or are we dealing with a 1968 situation, a virulent strain of the flu virus but 
one that is not particularly lethal? 
 Bob: ‘We don’t know’ might have been a sensible answer? 
 
Andy: We didn’t know, but certainly there were no signals [of an exceptionally 
dangerous disease]. The World Health Organization classified swine flu as a global 
pandemic, meaning a potential 1918/9 flu scenario. But it killed hardly anybody, and 
didn’t seem to spread very fast from person-to-person. In retrospect it wasn’t much 
worse than your average winter flu. 
 
Bob: The problem is that at the time you don’t know how virulent and lethal it’s 
going to be. This is something you can only find out in retrospect. 
 
Andy: I was sitting there at the time, and I really didn’t think it was going to take off, 
but that was just a sort of personal feeling. If you took the SARS example, then you 
really did have a virulent virus rapidly spreading, but Public Health seemed to work 
quite well once the authorities begin to track it. I wonder why they didn’t have a little 
bit more confidence in rather more traditional Public Health approaches? They 
seemed to have lost their nerve with this. 
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i
 Skolbekken (1995) made a similar point in the pre-internet era about the increasing prominence of 
‘risk’ in medical research, using Medline as his analytical tool. It can be easily tested these days for 
any health issue, e.g. the proportion of papers with ‘coronary’ in the title which also include the word 
‘risk’ by using the ‘Googlescope’ via Google Scholar (Heyman, Shaw, Alaszewski and Titterton, 2010, 
pp. 3-4). 
ii
 Cynics, including the interviewer, might be less confident that professional risk analyses are driven 
by data rather than a priori feelings, assumptions or interests. 
